Skill intensive technologies seem to be adopted by rich countries rather than poor ones. Related to that observation, the ratio of wages of skilled to unskilled workers -the skill premium -shows two important features over time and across countries. In the US the skill premium decreased during the first half of the 20th century and it increased after 1950, evolving according to a U shaped pattern. On the other hand, the same measure across countries around 1990 is hump shaped when countries are ordered by GDP per worker.
Introduction
In order to understand why some countries are rich while others remain poor, recent work has concluded that differences in production technologies are as important or even more important than differences in factors of production such as physical and human capital.
Therefore the question is: why don't poor countries adopt more advanced technologies when they are available? One strand of recent work points towards differences in the skill intensity of the production function along the development spectrum, with skill intensive technologies being adopted as countries become richer. Optimal technological adoption decisions are made observing the price of the different production inputs, such as skilled workers, unskilled workers and physical capital. Therefore, the skill premium is intimately tied to the technology adoption decision. As a consequence a successful model for technical adoption should also be capable of capturing the evolution of the skill premium over time and across countries.
A large literature has emerged to understand how differences in production technologies over time and across countries may affect output. This literature ranges from exogenous barriers to the transfer of new technologies to a literature on "Appropriate Technology" 1 .
However, recent research on technological differences primarily focuses on skilled biased technological change. This literature shows potential in explaining seemingly puzzling observations in terms of skill premium both over time and across countries. This work focused initially on exogenous skilled bias technological change, offering little explanation as to why the technologies seemed to be relatively more intensive in the use of skilled workers in developed economies than in developing ones. This paper develops a systematic explanation as to why it is that we see ever more skill intensive technologies being adopted both in the time series for the US and across countries.
In doing so I provide a unified reason why the skill premium in the US decreased until 1950 and then increased, displaying a U shape pattern together with an ever growing stock of skilled workers. Across countries, the model explains how the technology adoption decision is related to the stage of development of each country.
To this end I construct and calibrate a general equilibrium dynamic model with endogenous decisions for both factor accumulation and technology adoption. The factor accumulation decision is over the stocks of skilled workers and with physical capital. The technology adoption decision focuses on the optimal level of skill bias in the production function in the presence of a convex technology adoption cost in terms of stocks of physical capital and skilled workers. This cost can be interpreted as an accelerated obsolescence in the stocks of skilled workers and physical capital due to technological change. When deciding which technology to adopt, the agents take into account the accelerated obsolescence on their stocks of production inputs. It is important to stress that the model is calibrated to the US around 1990 and, using the same set of parameter values, it is applied internationally.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review focused on the work on skill biased technological change and technology adoption. Section 3 is devoted to presenting the theoretical model. Section 4 calibrates the model to the US around 1990.
This calibration is used both for the time series for the US and for the international comparison. Sections 5 and 6 present the experiments on the US time series and across countries respectively. Section 7 concludes.
Literature review
This paper builds upon two distinct but related bodies of literature. The first is the literature on technology adoption. This literature can be divided into two different categories. The first are the papers that base their findings on irreversible decisions of different agents, such as Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), Greenwood and Yorokoglu (1997) and Jovanovic (1998) .
They base their findings in terms of the dynamic effects of technological change and adoption decisions to acquire skills or invest in technology specific embedded capital goods. The second category follows papers such as Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) and argues that the central mechanism is one of learning by doing where changes in technologies induce an informational cost. This cost lowers productivity temporarily as the technology is introduced into production.
The second literature is on skilled biased technological change. This literature claims that as economies develop, the intensity in the use of the different production inputs shifts towards the use of the skilled labor. Work on this area includes Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000) . In both of these cases technical change is taken as exogenous. On the other hand Caselli and Coleman (2006) introduce a choice of the production function. In their work, the economy adopts the technology that is optimal given the stocks of physical capital, skilled workers and unskilled workers. A partial equilibrium is considered, with no investment either in physical capital or human capital, and given those stocks, the optimal technology is chosen.
Exogenous skilled bias technological change has been suggested as an explanation to the puzzling observation that the skill premium grew together with the stock of skilled workers in the US since 1950. Previous to that date, the skill premium had been declining as observed by Goldin and Katz (1999) , accompanied with a growing number of skilled workers. Goldin and Katz (1999) argue that no satisfactory and unified explanation covers both the decreasing and increasing phases in the skill premium evolution along with an ever growing number of skilled workers.
Across countries, skill bias technological change has also been suggested to explain differences in the prices and number of skilled workers. Caselli and Coleman (2006) argue that the most developed countries tend to use technologies that are more intensive in the use of skilled labor. The findings in terms of skill premium across countries are very different to the US time series. Instead of observing an increasing skill premium as countries develop as one would suspect from the evidence in the second half of the 20th century in the US time series, the evidence points towards a hump shape relationship between skill premium and development.
In their recent paper, Funk and Vogel (2004) , show that technological change does not have to be skill biased and conclude that instead of being assumed, the skill bias technical change can be an equilibrium result. The same feature can be found in Acemoglu (2002) , where he describes technological change bias as a function of both prices and stocks of skills, with opposed results in terms of technological change. The price effect inducing innovation towards the scarce factor, the stock effect induces innovations towards the abundant one.
Both Funk and Vogel (2004) and Acemoglu (2002) , point out that technological change is not per se skill biased and give as an example the unskilled biased technical change that took place in the late 18th and early 19th century, where mass production replaced the artisan.
The Model Economy

Planner's problem
Time is discrete and there is no uncertainty. The utility function of the infinitely lived representative consumer is given by
The planner in this economy maximizes (3.1), subject to the following budget constraint
where C t denotes consumption in period t, I t denotes investment in physical capital in period t, and F () denotes the production function of final goods. F () is a function of b t , which indexes the technology adopted in period t and belongs to the unit interval. In addition to the technology parameter, the amount produced is a function of the stock of physical capital K p t , and both the skilled and unskilled labor devoted to the production of final goods, S pt , and U pt respectively.
The stocks of skilled labor, unskilled labor and physical capital, are divided as follows:
A variable with a subscript p denotes that that variable is being used in the production of final goods, and a variable with an e subscript denotes a variable that is being used in the production of skilled workers (interpreted as the educational sector). Variables without p or e subscript denote aggregates of physical capital or skilled labor.
Technological change is costly. The function G (b t , b t+1 ) in equations (3.6) and (3.7)
below maps changes in the production function into costs of adjustment, with the following The law of motion for the stocks of physical capital and skilled workers are as follows:
Combining (3.2) and (3.7) we get the resource constraint for the economy
The problem can be written as the maximization of (3.1), subject to (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), and (3.8). I denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with this optimization as τ t , φ t , η i t , θ t and λ t respectively.
Other than the choice of the technological parameter b t+1 , the first order conditions are standard. The first order condition with respect b t+1 is
The first term captures the cost of choosing b t+1 in terms of accelerated obsolescence for both K t and S t , and the second and third terms reflect the benefits. The benefits are divided into two terms. The second term of the equation captures the increased production due to the change in technology and the last term captures the benefit in terms of technology adoption at t + 1. This last term captures the benefit when transiting to b t+2 for having moved to b t+1 . This captures the change in cost incurred due to technical change from having chosen b t+1 as a stepping stone in the transition from b t to b t+2 .
The steady state satisfies:
Where equation (3.10) is the standard first order condition with respect to capital and equation (3.11 ) is the first order condition with respect to skilled workers which is also standard once we take into account that when the stock of skilled workers grows, the stock of unskilled workers shrinks. Equation (3.12) is determining the optimal levels of skilled workers, unskilled workers and physical capital across sectors. Finally equation (3.13) shows that in steady state no more improvements can be made by shifting the technology away from b. This is the case since the function G (b t , b t+1 ) is symmetric and therefore
= 0. Note that in steady state the function G(b, b) does not play a role, since it only affects the transition across technologies.
Market equilibrium
There are two types of agents in the market equilibrium that implement the planner's equilibrium shown above. Households own physical capital and make decisions about skills accumulation and technology choice. Firms are competitive and produce final output.
Firms
Firms producing final goods can be ordered according to the technology they operate b.
Firms operate for one period. They rent unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital of type b from the household in order to maximize profits. In other words in every period there is demand for unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital of every type b, 0 < b < 1. The market under which firms operate is perfectly competitive. The problem each firm of type b solves is:
The optimal conditions for each type b firm are:
Where w s t (b) stands for wages for skilled workers offered by a firm operating technology b in period t, w u t (b) stands for wages for unskilled workers offered by a firm operating technology b in period t and r t (b) represents the interest rate offered by firms operating technology b in period t. And p t stands for the price of final goods, which is normalized to 1. So, for every b-type firm, their maximizing behavior determines wages and the interest rate under each technology. Therefore at every moment in time we have a function of wages and interest rate as function of the parameter b.
Firms can also be interpreted as freely choosing the any production parameter
where it is necessary to hire K p and S p of that type in order to produce final goods.
Households
A set of atomistic representative households own capital and labor. Given prices, they rent capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor to the firm every period The capital and skilled labor they own is of type b and can only be used in production in a type b firm. They make investment and education decisions. Education is undertaken internally to the household 2 .
This means that the household decides how much capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor to supply to the market given prices. The part of capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor that is not supplied is used to produce more skilled labor for the next period. Every period the type of physical capital and skills the household owns is given but can be changed for the future, so the household not only chooses the evolution of the quantity of physical capital and skilled labor but also its type for the future.
The problem of the representative consumer can be written as follows
subject to
Where variables S(b) and K(b) denote the type of the skills and physical capital.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is defined by a sequence of prices 3 
and technology parameters {b t } ∞ t=0 , such that:
1.-Households maximize utility. That is they solve the problem defined by equation
2.-Firms maximize profits. That is, for every technology parameter, equations (3.14)
are satisfied.
3.-Initial conditions. That is b 0 , S 0 , and K 0 , are given.
4.-Market clearing condition:
Since households are identical I focus on the equilibrium where each household supplies to the market only one technology type skilled worker and physical capital and that type is the same across households.
Calibration 4.1. Functional forms
The instantaneous utility function is of the form
Given that the functions {ws(bt), wu(bt), r(bt)}
are only observable at the adopted b, I can expand the function around that point. Let b F be the adopted technology, then ws(b
At the equilibrium point, it is possible to determine the derivative of those wages and interest rates with respect to b F t . In equilibrium, the price functions are linear functions of b such that their slope is given by
The technology adjustment cost function G() is given by
This function satisfies the requirements stated above, G(b t , b t ) = 0 and
Note that the function G (b t , b t+1 ) is convex, which is in line with a whole literature of convex adjustment cost, which induce the planner or the market to take small steps in adjusting the technology instead of taking big jumps. Also note that the function G (b t , b t+1 )
has the property that its derivatives in steady state are equal to zero, enabling me to write
) is affected by only one parameter, ζ. As ζ increases the costs associated with technological change (in terms of skilled workers and physical capital), increase, affecting the dynamic transition outside steady state.
The choice of the production function of final goods, F (), is not straightforward. Since one of the features I want the model to capture is the evolution of the skill premium, it should be the case that skilled and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes. Therefore I restrict attention to the family of nested CES functions, with inputs K p , S p and U p . Let Ω (A t , B t ; a, ) be a CES function between inputs A t and B t with weights parameter a and elasticity parameter . The technological choice of interest is constrained to the skill biased parameter, which I will call b for "bias". Therefore I restrict attention to the CES weights between terms containing skilled workers and unskilled workers. Then the possible nested CES forms are:
F 1 is the production function of choice in both Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) and Caselli and Coleman (2006) . The problem with this functional form is given by equation (3.13) , since that requires that in steady state U = ιS, where ι denotes some constant,
independent of the level of T.F.P. The condition of U = ιS is a direct consequence of the linearity of the CES function with respect to b. F 2 is the production function used by Krusell et. al. (2000) . They argue in favor of F 2 instead of F 3 because data collected by Hamermesh (1993) 5 suggest that the elasticity of substitution between S and U is higher than that between S and K, and function F 3 restrict them to be equal. This feature in the data comes from estimates of the partial elasticity of substitution, which depends on the levels of S, U and K, and not only on the substitution parameter. As I show later, the partial elasticity of substitution in specification F 3 between S and U is higher than that between S and K. The problem with specification F 2 is that under the parameters suggested by Krusell Of the 3 possibilities, F 3 is the only one that generates an evolution towards skill intensive technologies without imposing a ration of U/S in steady state that is independent of total factor productivity. It is also consistent with the data in terms of partial elasticities of substitution as it is shown later.
To summarize the production function used in the quantitative exercise is given by
Under this specification of the production function, the skill premium can be written as: 5 Hamermesh (1993) reports a wide rage for the partial elasticity of substitution between S, U and K, and Krusell et al (2000) take the midpoint of that range. Even though the the definition here of S and U differs from Krusell el al (2000) , I use the same parameter value as the objective because the range of estimates in Hamermesh (1993) is so wide and also for comparison reasons.
which shows that there are three terms affecting the skill premium which are derived from three different sources.
The term L t is the "technological" factor, M t the "relative supply of skills" factor and N t the "capital deepening" factor. As b t decreases (which we interpret as skilled bias technological change) the term L t increases which results in a higher skill premium. As the stock of skilled workers grows (and the stock of unskilled workers shrinks) the relative supply factor, M t , decreases, decreasing the skill premium, given that ρ 2 is negative. Finally as the amount of capital per unskilled worker grows, the capital deepening factor increases, together with the skill premium. Therefore the final evolution of the skill premium will be a result of a horse race between these three different factors. Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998) have a similar decomposition for the skill premium (with only the technological factor and the relative supply of skills) where they exogenously input a log linear technological term, and find that for Canada the technological factor grows at around 3.5% per year. In this paper I derive the technological factor endogenously and find a slower rate of growth, which is expected given that in this case we also have the capital deepening factor growing. The average sum of the rate of growth of L t and N t for 1940 to 2000 in the model is 4.25%.
Finally the function H() is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
The specification of the law of motion for the stock of skilled workers in equation (3.6) does not restrict S t to be less than 1, in the case of high enough K e . Even though this is possible, the planner never chooses an S t > 1 because the productivity of the unskilled workers approaches infinity as U t approaches zero.
Choice of Parameters
In order to obtain the parameters of the model, I calibrate the system to the US circa 1990. I
can only calibrate out of steady state, otherwise ζ would not be identified 6 . So, the model is calibrated to a transition point in 1990. In order to do that, the path of GDP per worker that Sensitivity analysis on this assumption was performed and as long as the future steady state is far enough and the convergence to it is smooth, the results for the period 1940 -2000 are not affected. 6 Since in steady state there is no technological adoption friction 7 I also constructed the path of GDP starting in 1920 and the general results do not differ. Even though the starting point of the computation has some relevance, having started the problem in 1920 shows that the results are not driven by that choice. Table 2 .
Parameter values
The parameters of the model are presented in table 1 Table 2 presents the identifying moments used to calibrate the model. 8 Return to 8 years of schooling calculated as exp(ω t 8), where ω t equals the return to one year of high school for "All men" reported by Goldin and Katz (1999) . 9 From DeLong, Goldin and Katz (2003) average between 1980 and 2000 for workers with more than 8 years of schooling. 10 This is the ratio of Personal Consumption Expenditures to Personal income reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, in its table 2.1 for the year 1990 11 Calculated as the ratio of students enrolled in primary school times the participation rate over the total labor force. Source: Statistical Abstract of The US for 1994 (data taken for 1990). 12 Obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the US 1990 13 Obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the US for 1990 14 σ S,U equals the partial elasticity of substitution between S and U. Therefore,
is the ratio of partial
US Data
In order to construct the series for GDP per worker for the US, I take data from 1950 to 2000 The results are not sensitive to the choice of future paths of GDP per worker as long as abrupt changes close to the data window are not introduced 16 .
Since this paper focuses on the long run behavior of the economy, the series of GDP per worker is smoothed using a Hodrick Prescott filter.
Following DeLong, Goldin and Katz (2003) , the number of skilled workers in the US, is taken from decennial census data from 1940 to 2000. A skilled worker is defined as an individual with educational achievement higher than primary school. The reason for using a relatively low cutoff is that in poor countries a large fraction of the workforce has less than 6 years of schooling.
The skill premium data for the US, is constructed using the return to High School reported Other data used to calibrate the model come from standard sources.
Consumption-output ratio, is taken from the NIPA tables and educational expenditures per pupil over GDP per worker and expenditures in educational wages over total educational expenditures are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the US.
elasticities of substitution between S and U and S and K. According to Krusell et al (2000) it is 2.49, which is based in turn in calculations reported by Hamermesh (1993) . It is computed following Uzawa (1962) 15 In their study Baier et al (2004) find that TFP was constant up to 1940 and in that year it stated increasing in an almost linear way. 16 Both the convergence horizon and the speed of convergence do not affect the results as long as enough time and no abrupt change in the growth rate of GDP per worker is introduced. The choice is made so as to make the size of the problem as small as possible for computational reasons
US Dynamics
The goal of this section is to analyze the endogenously generated dynamics of the skill premium and skill bias once the economy is confronted with a path of total factor productivity that perfectly matches the evolution of the GDP per worker in the US after 1940.
For this experiment the US economy is assumed to be in steady state before 1940 17 . At that point it is assumed that the set of available technologies expanded. This does not imply that the new technologies would be adopted immediately. The growth in TFP induces the adoption of those technologies as the stocks of physical and human capital become available.
The idea in the experiment is that these technologies were available from the beginning of time but were slowly implemented as total factor productivity grew.
The model determines the stock of capital, unskilled workers, skilled workers, their distribution across the educational and production sectors, their prices and the bias in the technology. The results in terms of dynamics for the US are shown in the next set of figures.
The endogenous dynamics in terms of skill premium implied by the model are shown in Figure   5 .1. The model provides a unified explanation for the evolution of the skill premium both before and after 1950. The U shape in the skill premium is generated with an endogenous skill biased technological change. During the whole period endogenous skill biased technological change is generated, not only after 1950 as previously explored by the literature. This effect is generated by the simultaneous effects of technological change and investments in skills and physical capital as depicted in Figure 5 .2.
The decomposition of the skill premium into the technological factor, the relative supply of skills factor and the capital deepening factor is shown in Figure 5 .2.
From Figure 5 .2 it is clear that the decreasing phase of the skill premium up to around 1950 is primarily determined by the behavior of the ratio unskilled to skilled workers devoted to production. Later, it is the effects of the technological change and investment in physical capital that determine the increase in skill premium.
The intuition behind the initial reaction is that once the economy is faced with the new paths for total factor productivity, it starts producing skilled workers at a high rate since it has to get to a higher level of skilled workers in the new equilibrium and also because but the term based on capital per unskilled worker is affected by both decreasing stocks of unskilled workers and higher levels of physical capital. Both elements contribute to increases in the skill premium. Even though capital and skills depreciate in the same way as a result of technological change, since δ s < δ k , the stock of skilled workers is relatively (to its steady state evolution) more affected by the accelerated obsolescence induced by the evolution of b t .
Therefore the initial response to TFP favors the creation of skills.
The key element in the model is the skilled biased technological change. In the model it is endogenous and expressed by the variable (1 − b t ) . The dynamic evolution of that variable is shown in Figure 5 .3. Where we see both the results implied by the model and the estimates from the data, and in both cases a transition towards a technology intensive in terms of skill premium is observed. In order to estimate the skill bias parameter shown in Figure 5 .3 I calculate b t as: 
here skp t represents the skill premium at time t. 18 The model delivers endogenous skill bias technological change, which is a direct result of increases in the exogenous path for TFP. As TFP grows, the economy can devote more resources to the production of skilled workers and once more skilled workers are available it is optimal to undertake production under ever more skill intensive technologies.
In other words, once the economy is confronted with a new path for TFP this changes the demand for skilled workers and physical capital, since the equilibrium technology shifts towards a new one more intensive in skilled workers. The initial decreasing phase in the evolution of the skill premium is driven by rapid changes in the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers devoted to the production sector. Both skilled and unskilled workers are reallocated as a result of the new path of total factor productivity to the educational sector in greater numbers than in the previous steady state. This reallocation is driven by two forces. First, when total factor productivity is higher, so is the steady state level of (1 − b) and, therefore, the optimal level of skilled workers is also higher, given that their marginal product grew.
Second, during the transition the rate at which the stocks of skilled workers become obsolete is higher than in the steady state equilibrium. Therefore, in equilibrium the economy chooses the model and estimated from the data a higher level of skilled workers and higher rate of obsolescence, which implies that more and more resources are devoted to the educational sector at the expense of the production one.
The increasing phase in skill premium post 1950 is generated almost exclusively by the changes in technology and the increases in physical capital into the production sector that enter in full effect after the stocks of skilled workers had been created and can enter the production sector.
As independent evaluation of the model, the evolution of the capital share of GDP and the evolution of the stock of skilled workers are reported in Figure 5 .4. Capital share, over the period 1940 -2000, remains close to 30%, which is what many studies suggest should be the number for the US 19 . In terms of the ratio of skilled workers to total labor force, the model predicts a range smaller than what the data suggests, but still it captures most of its evolution.
Cross Country Evidence
This section serves a dual purpose. First it serves as an independent evaluation of the model, because the same parameter values that were obtained from the calibration for the US are used in the cross country context. Second, it endogenously generates the evolution of the 19 This is not straight forward since the production function is of the CES form [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] 21 . The stock of skilled workers is computed using data from Barro and Lee (1993) , using the same definition as for the US case. The skill premium is computed using data from returns to schooling from Bils and Klenow (2000) , and the duration of primary school as Caselli and Coleman (2006).
Experiment
The experiment across countries is the following: Begin in 1940 in steady state for every decile of the distribution of the GDP per worker and choose a sequence of TFP that matches the evolution of GDP per worker for each decile from 1940 to 2000, and impose convergence to a decile specific level by taking the last 5 years of data and letting the growth rate of GDP 20 The countries included in the database are those with long series of GDP per worker (1960 to 1996) and that have an estimate of skill premium in the database by Bils and Klenow (2000) . 21 The data is extended back to 1940 so as to have a comparable experiment to the US.
per worker decrease linearly from the average growth rate from the last 5 years to 0 in 50 years, and after that stay constant for ever. The model is shifted to the right with respect to the data, but it is in the right scale and predicts a hump shape in skill premium, much as the one obtained from the data. As in the US case, the skill premium can be decomposed into three terms which depend on Even though the model predicts that countries will adopt ever more skill biased technolo- 22 An additional complication arises with the comparison between model and data in terms of skill premium across deciles, because we do not have data gathered in the same year across countries, so instead of checking what the model implies for 1990 in terms of skill premium, I take the average by decile of the year in which the observation reported by Bils and Klenow (2000) was made and bring that number from the model for each decile.
23 I use the median by decile of the returns to schooling instead of the averages so as to avoid the effects induced by outlyers. In particular Jamaica, Honduras and Indonesia. 
and
ies as they develop, the dominating mechanisms in terms of the cross-country comparison of the skill premium are those generated by differences in the capital to unskilled worker ratio and the skilled to unskilled workers ratio in the production sector Even more interesting is the dynamic behavior for skill premium for all the deciles over time. The fact that they follow different trajectories of TFP so as to match GDP per worker makes the skill premium differ greatly in terms of its dynamic path across deciles. What is clear from Figure 6 .3 is that the reaction of the skill premium differs from decile to decile, describing three main patterns. First, in the first decile we see a U shape pattern.
Deciles 3 and 4 start in 1940 with increases in skill premium but then decline by 1980. In the remaining deciles there seems to be a small change in skill premium. The differences across deciles arise from differences in the initial conditions and the paths of total factor productivity necessary to match the evolution of GDP per worker.
In terms of technology adoption, the parameter (1 − b) chosen across deciles is depicted in Figure 6 .4. There it is clear that the production technology in use in the higher deciles As an independent evaluation of the model, Figure 6 .6, shows the evolution of the stock of skilled workers across deciles in 1990. The model's overprediction the stock of skilled workers is a direct consequence of the fact that it is calibrated to US, data which can be considered an outlier even in the top decile. Therefore , apart from the scale bias discussed above, the model predicts the correct relationship between the stock of skilled workers and level of GDP.
Conclusion
The literature on skill biased technological change argues that it explains the observed patterns of skill premium both in the US and across countries. In this model I endogenize the technology adoption decision, and generate endogenous skill biased technological change that is consistent with the data for the US time series and the cross country evidence in terms of skills formation and skill premium.
The model has potential in explaining why it is that poor countries do not adopt newer technologies when they are readily available and implemented in more advanced countries.
The fact that there is a cost associated with changing the technology in terms of inputs makes that transition costly and may take long periods of time. It is an alternative argument to the barriers of adoption argued by Parente and Prescott (2000) . Here, instead of monopoly groups protecting their rents, it is optimal in a competitive setting to delay the adoption of more advanced technologies in the face of technology adoption costs.
Total factor productivity still plays a major role in the paper suggesting that there may still be a channel similar to that of Parente and Prescott (2000) , in the sense that T.F.P. differences are still needed to account for income differences across countries and time. Skill Premium: The skill premium data is constructed from Goldin and Katz (1999).
They report returns to High School and College for young men and all men. I take the return to High school for all men as the return to education for each year. The return to 8 years of schooling calculated as exp(ω t 8), where ω t equals the return to high school "All men" reported by Goldin and Katz (1999) . Using the data described above and the parameters chosen in the calibration shown in table 1, I was able to construct a series for A t . The only missing data was the evolution of K t . And, not only that, but also the fact that there is a scale issue with the capital stock. Skilled workers: The stocks of skilled workers, defined as "those with more than primary school" are constructed from Barro and Lee (1993) , for the year 1990.
